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ceedings. It is, in fact, the most expeditious method, when there
are no genuine fact issues, for concluding any proceeding and
would appear most appropriate of all for a "summary" one.
The court then directed its attention to the second motion made
by the landlord to dismiss an affirmative defense pursuant to
3211(b) of the CPLR. The court stated that the question to be
determined is not whether the pleadings appear to be sufficient,
nor whether they are technically correct, but whether there is
"substance behind the facade." 215 Under CPLR 3211 the court's
inquiry must be directed to whether "the pleader has a claim
or defense rather than whether he has properly stated one." 216
This distinction is an important one for the practitioner. It permits
him to introduce evidence on the motion to determine if the pleading has substance. It makes no difference that it purports on its
face to state a cause of action.
The case is a valuable one in that it establishes, as a simple
proposition, that CPLR 3211 and 3212 are available as procedural
tools to assist in the determination of summary proceedings.
ARTICLE

34-

CALENDAR

PRACTICE; TRIAL PREFERENCES

Statement of readiness-Even upon consent of both parties,
restoration of a case to the calendar must be at the foot thereof.
In Scully v. Jefferson Truck Renting Corp.2 17 the action was

removed from the calendar for failure to file a timely statement
of readiness. The parties submitted a stipulation consenting to
the placement of the action to its original numerical position on
the trial calendar. The court reinstated the action, but did so
at the foot of the trial calendar. The court held that it has no
authority, regardless of the cause for delay, to return this action
to its original numerical position. 218
The statement of readiness is governed by the rules of the
court in the four departments respectively. The rules for the second
department, which the court in the instant case has applied,
are contained in part 7 of the second department court rules and
provide that a negligence action may be placed upon the calendar
without a statement of readiness being filed. However, an action
so filed will be removed from the calendar if the statement is not
filed within one year after the filing of the note of issue. It is
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251 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
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Misc. 2d 48, 249 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
Scully v. Jefferson Truck Renting Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 48, 52, 249
N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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further provided that upon motion made within one year following
a removal from the calendar, an action
which has been removed
219
may be replaced at the foot thereof.
The court's conclusion that it may replace the action only
at the foot of the calendar under the present rules may be seen
more clearly by reference to the prior rules. The rules effective
in 1958 (but now superseded) state that if a motion to restore
the action to the calendar is granted, "the action must be placed
at the foot of the general trial calendar; provided, however, that
for good cause shown . . . the justice presiding in his discretion

may order the action placed in any other appropriate calendar
position." 220 The last clause, allowing judicial discretion to determine the calendar position upon restoration, is not contained
in the present rules.
The court further reasoned that even though both parties consented, a restoration would defeat
the purpose of the rule, which
22
is to penalize a dilatory party.
The practitioner's attention is called to ihe fact that if he
fails to have the action restored within one year of its removal,
the action "shall be dismissed . . . for neglect to prosecute." 222
In conclusion, if the practitioner requires longer than the
one year to file his statement of readiness, he may obtain an
extension, upon motion to the court,223 which will be granted if good

cause is shown.
ARTIcLE

41-

TRIAL BY A JURY

"Quotient verdict" illegal; "averaging" legal.
The New York City Civil Court in denying defendant's motion to set aside a jury's verdict, explained in detail the methods
by which a jury may arrive at its verdict. 224 The defendant in
this case based his motion on statements made by the jury foreman when he announced the verdict. When questioned as to the
jury's decision the foreman stated, "it [the verdict] was decided
upon by the Jury, an average method.. ." Thereafter the jury
was polled and found to be unanimous in its decision. After being
polled, the foreman, in answer to a question by the defendant's
attorney, stated that "the amount of money was arrived at by
averaging."
N.Y. App. Div. R. VIII, pt. 7 (2d Dep't 1964).
21-17 (1958 ed.).
221Supra note 218.
222 CPLR 3404. The statute of limitations consequences of a dismissal
for neglect to prosecute should be borne in mind here. See CPLR 205.
223 Supra note 219.
224 Honigsberg v. New York City Transit Authority, 43 Misc. 2d 1,
249 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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